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Abstract
As the U.S. experience revealed after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
zero lower bound (ZLB) limits the Fed’s capacity to stimulate the economy
through conventional methods of monetary policy. The GFC provided a
chance to advance unconventional tools to strengthen economic growth
and reclaim financial stability. One of the aims of the existing unconven-
tional tools has been to provide liquidity to the banks. To account for the
dynamic reality of the financial ecosystem, we propose two new instru-
ments through which the Fed targets nonbank securities dealers and debt
issuers explicitly. By design, these tools should be used as last resort op-
tions. The first tool called the “Dealer Option” and functions by opening
the Fed’s balance sheet to securities dealers to increases liquidity in the
market. The second tool, “Elastic Legal Policy,” suggests relaxing legal
constraints in debt securities contracts during the financial crisis to reduce
debt issuers’ default risks. Given the interconnectedness of balance sheets
and cash flows as well as the role of securities dealers as market makers,
the elastic legal policy and dealer option help reduce debtors’ defaults and
liquidity risk during a financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
To capture the rise of “Market-Based Finance,” we use an extension of Treynor’s
model of security dealers and propose a conceptual framework to extend the
Fed’s dealer of last resort role to the capital market during the financial cri-
sis. These tools specifically target the leading players in the capital market,
namely dealers in debt and derivatives securities, as well as debt issuers. As
the U.S. experience revealed, after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), ZLB lim-
its the Fed’s ability to stimulate the economy through conventional methods
of monetary policy. This gives leeway for new tools to be introduced with the
capabilities to combat that issue. The first tool is aimed at opening the Federal
Reserve to the nonbanks securities dealers. The second tool expands legal policy
and makes it more lenient for debt issuers to make their payments. These mea-
sures help debt and derivative securities dealers to maintain the value of their
inventories and survive the financial crisis. The former “makes market” in debt
securities while the latter issues the corresponding interest rate swaps, credit
default swaps, and exchange rate swaps for hedging and cash flow management
purposes. Ultimately the two tools revealed to be intertwined at their core and
worked together to provide both market and funding liquidity and to promote
financial stability. Their power stemmed from the ability to not only focus on
the capital market or money market but the financial market as a whole. Cru-
cially, these benefits would only be accessible for dealers and debt issuers once
a recession is looming or already in full effect, similar to when unconventional
monetary policy tools are used. The legal theory of finance (LTF hereafter),
which asserts the idea that “finance is legally constructed” is employed to unveil
the interconnectedness of the two tools.
The premises of the LTF provide the bases for the two policy tools
presented in this paper. It is an inductive theory. There are four different com-
ponents that makeup LTF. The first part states that financial markets are a
“rule-bound system”. This is referring to the idea that law is not only an add-
on but is a component of the financial market. The more an entity solidifies its
position within the marketplace, the higher the level of responsibility towards
the government. The second component is that there is an “essential hybridity”
between states and markets. Since finance is a hierarchical system, there is an
interconnectedness between the public and private sectors. This interconnect-
edness was revealed during the financial crisis, when the Fed- with its unlimited
access to high-powered money- was the only place left to go for banks to convert
their assets into currency. The third component is that law is “indispensable to
markets but can hasten their demise.” law makes it possible for financial instru-
ments to be enforced, but these enforcements could ultimately bring down the
financial system under different circumstances. The fourth and final component
is that law is “elastic”, which refers to the idea that legal constraints can be
relaxed or tightened depending on the health of the economy.
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The first tool, labeled as “dealer option,” allows for convertibility in the
Fed by securities dealers. This tool is founded on LTF’s premises of essential
hybridity and convertibility. It is also based on Rick’s (2018) public option
proposal to open the Fed’s account not only to banks but to the public. As
Pistor (2013) showed, central banks are not obliged by law to offer convertibility
to most or all assets into legal tender and are sometimes explicitly barred from
doing so. Legal restrictions like this could be preventing a multitude of effective
policy options from restoring financial stability. The implementation of the
dealer option will be through the Fed’s balance sheet by allowing securities
dealers to have an account at the Fed. The dealer option tool would aid the Fed
in its goal of liquidity provision to the financial market, which is a big necessity
during a liquidity crunch.
LTF features such as the elasticity and the indispensability of the law
in the financial market as well as essential hybridity, are the bases for the second
tool called “elastic legal policy.” The elastic legal policy tool implies the sus-
pension of the thorough execution of the law, where the survival of the system
is in jeopardy. If the Fed lowers debt securities cash flows during recessions and
allows for higher payments during booms, they could provide more elasticity
in the market and reduce the likelihood of defaults during a liquidity crunch.
This policy mimics a tax cut during recessions, with the debt paid back during
periods of more robust growth. The possibility to make changes to certain as-
pects of a contract can allow the Fed to extend the maturity date of the debt
securities, adjust the interest rate, and more. This type of legal adjustments
to debt contracts does not require legislative action, but an addition of a legal
code. These codes will allow the Fed to implement these adjustments to interest
payments and maturity dates, essentially providing a broader definition of the
timeline in which securities investors need to earn a competitive return. Instead
of giving investors a nearly fixed return every year, regulators should promise
adequate returns over the entire course of the business cycle.1
The expansionary legal policy will allow the targeting of specific seg-
ments of the economy and allow for liquidity provision to the most impoverished
markets. It will do this by providing credit to dealers in a time when liquidity
is scarce. The possibility to make changes to certain aspects of a contract can
allow the Fed to extend the maturity date of securities, adjust the interest rate,
and more. Instead of looking at debt securities and derivatives merely as a fi-
nancial asset, this policy acknowledges the legal component of these contracts.
Contracts are crucial to all financial market transactions. The ability to ad-
just them during a recession opens an array of impactful methods that can be
specific to each circumstance. There are some limitations of the proposal, such
as the emergence of moral hazards, the requirement of having to adjust regula-
1This tool draws on the “expansionary legal policy” idea of Listokin (2019) to relax legal
constraints in times when the economy is experiencing a deep recession. However, while
Listokin’s argument is centered around utility companies and the Keystone pipeline, this
paper analyzes the capital market applications of his argument.
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tions, and political resistance. However, the benefits of the proposal significantly
outweigh the costs.
The tools of expansionary legal policy and the dealer option could
have an immense impact on saving the economy in a ZLB recession. The dealer
option tool for opening the Fed’s balance sheet to the dealers would increase
liquidity, allowing them to have direct access to funding liquidity and continue
providing market liquidity. This legal option helps with stabilizing the econ-
omy and financial market by simplifying the liquidity provision of the Fed at
the apex of the financial crisis. Further, allowing nonbanks access to the Fed’s
balance sheet can also improve financial stability and economic growth. Part
1 is Economic background and historical context for Unconventional Monetary
Policy. Part 2 Discusses the Public Option tool Part 3 Discusses the Expan-
sionary Legal Policy tool Part 4 Addresses their hybridity 5 Acknowledges the
counterarguments and limitations of the tools Part 6 Concludes.
2 Economic Background and Historical Context
Once the 2008 financial crisis hit, the financial market began to collapse in both
capital -with the collapse of the Lehman Brothers- and money markets -with
the collapse of Washington Mutual. Some might view the financial crisis as
a solvency crisis- the crisis in which the value of the assets is lower than the
liabilities. However, it more so echoed the characteristics of a liquidity crisis.
Financial institutions had assets, and those assets still retained their value, but
there were no buyers. In a well-functioning, capital market or financial market
prices are the keys. If the market cannot produce the right prices, especially for
liquidity and risk, there cannot be a financial market. When the central bank
began to take action, it recognized the nature of the crisis and tried to rescue
both the money and capital market by providing extensive liquidity.2
In the capital market, securities dealers make the market in derivatives
and determine risk prices in the process. Once U.S. investors hold debt securities
issued by a German manufacturer, for example, they face three significant types
of risk. The first is an exchange rate risk because of the conversion from euros
to dollars. The second type is credit risk since there is no guarantee that the
German business does not default and can continue paying the payments. The
final type of risk is interest rate risk because, within the period of holding a
bond, the interest rate can fluctuate, affecting returns. In order to mitigate
these risks, investors turn to the capital market where they purchase different
types of derivatives, such as FX swap, interest rate swap, and credit default
swap, from the dealers to hedge their positions. Through this process, the
2The capital market is the financial market where long term debt and equity-backed secu-
rities are sold.
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securities dealers make the market and determine the price of risk. Just like
insurance companies, derivatives dealers guarantee the rates of returns.
Despite this, when the financial crisis occurred, the dealers were not
able to follow through with this guarantee, urging the Fed to step in. In doing
so, the Fed’s goal was not to solely support asset prices. The ultimate objective
of the Fed was to help bail out the derivatives dealers in order for them to con-
tinue making the market and pricing risk to maintain financial stability. The
Fed did this through asset purchasing programs. Usually, during open market
operations, the Fed would purchase short term government securities; however,
they decided to expand this operation. QE1 involved the purchase of mortgage-
backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. QE2 involved
purchases of long-term government bonds, which decreased the long-term inter-
est rate to encourage investment. Although the Fed could have stopped there,
it instead introduced an open-ended combination of QE 1 and QE 2, known as
QE 3, which involved purchasing riskier securities not backed by government
agencies. These monetary policies were all aimed at aiding the capital market
rather than the money market.
Another essential market that collapsed after the GFC is the money
market, which involves short-term borrowing. The global money dealers’ pri-
mary function is to provide short-term borrowing and price liquidity in the
interim. They act as an intermediary between financial participants that have
long positions in cash and are willing to earn extra interest rate by lending
money to those who require short-term borrowing at a higher interest rate.
Through this process, they earn the spread and price liquidity. When the fi-
nancial crisis occurred, most dealers were stuck with an abundance of securities
but had a shortage of cash. As a result of the crisis, value-based traders were
not lending to the dealers anymore. Therefore, money market dealers were not
able to receive loans and stopped making the market. This created a cascade
of defaults in the financial market that ultimately threatened financial stability.
This caused the Fed to step in with its unconventional monetary policies, whose
main objective was to provide liquidity to these nonbank institutions.
The Fed expanded its balance sheets to the investment banks and
implemented a multitude of programs. This allowed the banks to have money
and continue to price liquidity and make the market. The Fed intervened in
several ways. First, the Fed expanded the discount window and lowered the
discount rate. Second, it set up a Term Auction Facility, which made loans
through a competitive auction. Third, it opened the Fed’s balance sheets and
started lending not just to banks but to investment banks as well. The most
notable investment bank loan would be the one to JP Morgan for the purchase
of Bear Sterns and AIG. During the crisis, there were many different lending
facilities introduced, such as TAF, TSLF, PDCF, AMLF, MMIFF, CPFF, and
TALF. The Fed’s balance sheet supported all of these changes. With the housing
market’s demise, asset prices collapsed, the price of risk and the price of liquidity
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both increased. The goal of the two monetary policy tools presented in this
paper is to support asset prices and liquidity provision and in doing so, support
these two critical parts of the financial market. The Fed has already been
attempting to do this through different unconventional methods, and these two
tools can add to that toolkit.
3 Dealer Option and Liquidity Risk
This section aims to introduce a new tool, namely dealer option, for the Fed
to use at the cusp of the financial crisis and especially when the economy en-
counters a zero lower bound restriction. As Ricks (2018) argues and this paper
will emphasize, nonbank institutions that provide market-based finance such as
securities dealers should have access to the benefits that banks receive by hav-
ing an account at the Fed. These deposit accounts are called “Fed Account.”
Securities dealers are the providers of market liquidity, and the new tool enables
the Fed to directly backstop market-based finance where credit intermediation
happens outside the sphere of the traditional banking system. This option ex-
tends a multitude of benefits that banks receive by having an account at the
Fed to the securities dealer during a financial crisis. Some of these benefits
include having access to reserves, receiving interest on reserves when rates are
nearly zero, and in very desperate times, access to the Fed’s liquidity facilities.
Importantly, these benefits would only be accessible for securities dealers once
a recession is looming or already in full effect, similar to when unconventional
monetary policy tools are used. Conversely, the banks benefit from these ser-
vices both in normal times and during financial distress. As a result of the
dealer option implementation, central banking simplified, liquidity expanded,
and there would be a more stable financial system.
Mehrling (2012) provides a model of market-based finance, where the
risk is being transferred in the system through securities dealers. In effect, they
mobilize risk from investors in the capital market that invest in risky assets
to those who are willing to hold those risks. The securities dealers set the
price of risk in the process. A vital feature of this conceptual framework is the
focus on liquidity risk, rather than solvency risk and capital adequacy issues.
Specifically, dealers play the leading role in bearing the risk. Securities dealers’
price-setting and market-making activities depend on their ability to obtain
funding liquidity. These functions can be financed either through bank loans
or other money market instruments such as the repo, which uses securities as
collateral. In this structure, the Fed’s function to provide backstops for securities
dealers is crucial for the survival of the system.
The model highlights that fluctuations in the value of assets that the
dealers hold as well as the expansion of credit by dealers, affect the size of
their balance sheets. The former entails the acquisition of new capital, and the
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latter transfers securities to another financial participant to be used as collateral.
These balance sheet expanding operations should be financed. In other words,
when prices fluctuate or credit expansion is secured, dealers’ access to liquidity
is key for the continuation of these activities even though capital requirement
standards ensure they remain solvent throughout the process. Having failed to
receive additional funding, securities dealers might face their survival constraints
since they are unable to finance their liabilities. By construction, these are
liquidity problems rather than solvency ones, and hence the province of a central
bank.
Traditionally, the central banks’ undertaking of the lender of last re-
sort role has been one response to these problems. The Fed, for instance, could
lend to the banks directly and backstop the value of its deposit liabilities. Us-
ing Treynor’s model of securities dealers, banks are analyzed as dealers in the
global money market, and the Fed’s backstop enabled the continuous provision
of funding liquidity to the rest of the system, including to securities dealers.
However, in most cases, during the financial crisis, this indirect backstopping
of securities dealers have proven not to be enough. To account for the evolving
nature of modern finance, the Fed should specifically target nonbank securi-
ties dealers by directly lending to them and backstopping the liquidity of their
securities liabilities.
The extension of the Fed’s balance sheet to a few investment banks
in 2008 allowed them to continue making the market. This made the Fed the
lender of last resort for those few. During a crisis, this role of the Fed can be
transferred not only to a few investment banks but to the securities dealers as
well. This is the premise of the dealer option tool. The dealer option would
increase market liquidity by providing funding liquidity to the securities dealers.
The Fed would be acting as the lender of last resort for “securities” dealers- that
determine the price of risk. This expansion of the lender of last resort role of
the Fed to the nonbanks, hence, will support both the market for transferring
risk and transferring assets.
One of the most valuable aspects of the “dealer option” tool is the
extension of access to the Fed’s non-defaultable money to securities dealers
during a credit crunch. Allowing debt securities dealers to have access to non-
defaultable money during a liquidity crunch creates confidence about the state
of market liquidity. This, in effect, can halt runs on the financial market and
prevent investors from fire-selling debt securities at hugely discounted prices.
Without this protective measure, financial friction builds as a result of a lack
of access to liquidity and convertibility. Such frictions in the financial market,
as the recent crisis revealed, prevent institutions like Lehman Brothers from
continuing their day to day operations. If open access to the Fed was provided
to such institutions, it could prevent the domino effect of financial instability
that effectively rippled through the economy. Having access to non-defaultable
money provides financial stability through the increase of convertibility and
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liquidity.
Convertibility and liquidity are essential features of a well-functioning
market-based credit. Convertibility is an insurance device that allows investors
to convert the assets into the ultimate store of value- which is state money.
This convertibility is what determines the liquidity of an asset. The lack of
confidence in the financial market system contributes to the sudden and quick
withdrawals of money that affect the stability of the economy. During the crisis,
the probability of default increased, investors started selling their collateral and
stopped rolling over their lending in the repo market. The dealer option, can
restore trust in the financial market and transmit financial stability to the rest
of the financial system by increasing the convertibility of debt securities during
a severe financial condition.
The lack of trust in the financial market could lead to catastrophes
such as a fire-sale in the repo market and a run on MMFs. Given the severity
of the problems in the financial market, in order to sell, dealers were forced to
accept prices that were lower than the market price. This process was known
as a fire-sale. As a result of the increase in default risks during the crisis, many
institutional investors decided to withdraw their money from these markets.
This phenomenon was later called “run on money market mutual funds.” This
caused asset prices to decrease and interest rates to increase, which widened
the spread between the risk-free rates and the borrowing cost of corporations.
The consequent runs in the shadow banking system during the GFC led many
institutional investors to withdraw their money from mutual funds and the repo
market. Thus, the liquidity shortage during the financial crisis that originated
from the shadow banking system destabilized the whole financial market.
Further, the dealer option tool helps with re-imagining central banking
by simplifying its backstopping procedure and making it more reliable. First,
the central banking process becomes simplified with the elimination of many
lending facilities. Previously, the Fed created twenty of such facilities in order
to inject liquidity into the system. That would not have been necessary if the
Fed Account existed. Also, it makes the settlement and clearing process of the
dealers’ payment promises, or IOUs, more instantaneous and reliable since they
have direct access to the reserves at the Fed. This reduces a specific kind of
liquidity risk, namely settlement risk, that the dealers face when a corresponding
bank itself faces a liquidity problem. This challenge of re-imagining central
banking is not only due to the crisis.3 In retrospect, the crisis can be viewed
as the first full-fledged test of the new system of market-based finance. The
“market-based”, or the so-called shadow banking, dimension of this construction
that has involved the integration of capital markets with money markets is the
quintessential institutional form of this new construction4.
3Mehrling, (2014).
4Mehrling, (2013).
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4 Elastic Legal Policy and Default Risk
This section introduces the second tool that utilizes the elasticity of the law to
increase stability in the financial market once the economy hits the zero lower
bound recessions. More specifically, we propose to add two options to credit
derivatives contracts. The first modification involves changing the dollar amount
of interest payments when there is a financial crisis. The second change allows
the extension of the maturity of debt securities when maturing credit cycles
coincide with the economic recession. Such measures will stabilize finance when
money is the most needed. In the absence of such adjustments, debt cycles would
draw their natural cycles, making and destroying wealth along the way. This
is based on the “expansionary legal policy” idea of Yair Listokin that the law
should be different at the zero lower bound than when short-term interest rates
significantly exceed zero. This paper extends this idea to the capital market to
construct an argument for the use of elastic law by central banks, including the
Fed, during a financial crisis. The extension of this idea to the capital market
is called “elastic legal policy.”
Law has different economic effects at different phases of the business
cycle. The same law may be efficient at one point and inefficient at another. If
so, then the logic of law and economics maintains that the law should change as
a function of the business cycle. Because of this phenomenon, contracts’ legal
codes should be adjusted during a recession. Listokin provides a strong theo-
retical argument for why the law should be different at the zero lower bound
than at other times and explains why liquidity traps should be considered dif-
ferent from other recessions. Using the elasticity of law, as a policy during the
recession, can reduce default risk, which, in turn, reduces financial friction.
Expansionary legal policy, as proposed by Listokin, argues that in
order to encourage investment in the economy during zero lower bound, several
changes can be made legally that would result in an increased desire to invest.
If zoning restrictions, for instance, were looser during a recession, this would
incentivize businesses to begin projects even during a recession. Relaxation of
zoning law restrictions makes it easier for projects to get started putting the
good of the economy in front of trivial requirements. This would create jobs
at times when unemployment is at its peak while at the same time improving
infrastructure. As Listokin explains, it is like an “infrastructure stimulus plan
without the need for government spending.” These investment projects would
put money in investors’ pockets as well as the workers hired. This, in turn,
translates to increased demand and spending in the real economy.
The same logic can be extended to the financial market, given that
almost all financial instruments, especially debt instruments, are legal contracts.
During a liquidity trap, it is more likely that the debt issuers will experience the
full force of the law, generating higher default risk and more significant economic
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stress. During the GFC, for instance, the housing market was one of the first
to crash. This is due to extensive defaults in the financial market, where many
people were not able to meet their debt repayments. At that point, many had
withdrawn equity from their homes by taking out a second loan. As the market
began to collapse, many homes lost their value. This meant that even the sale
of the home would not be enough to cover the necessary payments, leading to
default.
Consequently, the holders of these Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
would not be receiving the revenue stream they were expecting. 5 The default
of all these securities at once meant investors would lack the capital to begin
new projects or fund existing ones, putting a halt to economic progress. The
elasticity of the law could be utilized to reach a consensus between debtor and
creditor that would prevent default. Defaulting is an undesirable outcome for
both parties of the transaction. Therefore, both would be willing to reach a
compromise if they are given the option.
In the financial context, the principal normative justification for law-
making is to correct market failures. Therefore, a change in financial markets
should drive a change in the law to the extent needed to correct market failures
resulting from the market change. Even then, however, the law does not, and
probably should not, attempt to correct all market failures. The extent to which
the financial market changes should drive legal changes depends on two sets of
consequences: first, the consequences of market failures resulting from market
changes, and second, the consequences of changing the law to attempt to correct
those failures. The first step of this consequence-based inquiry would be to iden-
tify financial market changes, to determine whether any market failures result
from those market changes, and to assess the consequences of those failures.
If those consequences are harmful, the next steps would be to consider legal
changes that could correct the market failures, to examine the consequences of
making those legal changes, and finally to balance consequences of the various
corrective options to reach a course of action.
Two calibrations to debt contracts are introduced in this paper to cor-
rect market failure during a financial meltdown. Importantly, both options can
be exercised by central banks during that period. One possible adjustment
could be an option outlined within the bond indenture that enables an interest
payment calibration on debt instruments. The indenture outlines the features
of the bond, including the maturity date, interest rate, and details of any ap-
plicable call provision and its triggering events. The debt instruments should
include an option (referred to as a “liquidity distress provision” for instance)
that gives the debtor (that is, the issuer) the right to modify the payments at
a significant discount while the economy is in a recession. The loss in profit
due to the reduction in the payments would be reconciled once the economy
5Holders of these securities were mostly institutional investors or pension funds holding on
to a number of different securities.
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is healthy again. In this circumstance, the investors would be forfeiting some
profit for the stability that occurs as a result of the reduction in default risk.
The other calibration would be to include an option in the contracts to extend
the maturities of the debt securities and allow for more time for debt repayments
by issuers when the economy is officially in crisis. In the given circumstance, if
there was an elasticity of law that could be applied to that contract, the debtors
might not have to default. If these provisions, exercised by the Fed, reduce debt
securities payments during a liquidity crunch, they could supply more elasticity
in the financial market and prevent cascades of defaults.
Some fixed-rate debt instruments, typically issued in private markets,
already include an option (frequently referred to as a “make-whole provision”)
that gives the debtor the right to pay off the debt before maturity at a significant
premium over the fair value of the debt at the date of settlement. One can argue
that the reverse of this option can be added to allow the issuers more time to pay
the face value during a financial crisis. However, a liquidity distress provision
goes beyond a standard option, which enables the issuer to benefit by prepaying
the debt when market interest rates decline. In a declining interest-rate market,
the settlement amount of a typical call option is less than what the fair value
of the debt would have been absent the call option. In contrast, a liquidity
distress provision involves settlement at a variable amount typically determined
by discounting the debt’s remaining contractual cash flows at a specified small
spread over- or below if the crisis is so severe- the current Treasury rate. This
is an emergency option in nature and can only be exercised by the Fed in a
recession.
Further, another critical point of Mehrling’s model is that, in a market-
based credit system, where funding is secured by collateral, the market value
of collateral plays a much more crucial role than in a bank-based credit sys-
tem. In such a system, therefore, the Fed’s liquidity backstop operations also
included the dealer of last resort function (known as Quantitative Easing) by
trading directly in the market for some subset of the risky assets that are serving
as collateral. However, it is not a definite task to estimate QE’s effectiveness
since asset markets tend to anticipate future policy actions.6 Under the circum-
stances, alternative measures such as an elastic legal policy that inject elasticity
to the system can help the Fed to rescue the financial market in the next finan-
cial crisis.
These calibrations are based on another premise of the LTF, namely
essential hybridity. Financial systems are not state or market, private or public,
but always and necessarily both (Mehrling, (2013)). This follows from the fact
that financial instruments must be enforceable, that finance is hierarchical and
that in the last instance, a sovereign has to stand in to protect the financial
system from self-destruction. The more an entity solidifies its position within the
marketplace, the higher the level of responsibility towards the government. In
6Belke et al., (2017)
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the meantime, market dynamics frequently put financial entities in direct tension
with commitments enshrined in law or contracts. This is the case, especially in
times of financial crises, when the full enforcement of legal commitments would
result in the self-destruction of the financial system. Further, law and economics
favor legal decisions that are efficient. If the law should be efficient and what
is effective changes with the business cycle, the law surely needs to change with
the business cycle.
Treynor’s model shows that the survival of dealers in the financial
market depends on their ability to manage price risk. During the financial
crisis, debt issuers find it more challenging to service their liabilities, and the
default scenarios increase. This reduces the value of those debt securities. The
elastic legal policy reduces the possibility of debtors’ defaults when the financial
system as a whole is vulnerable by increasing elasticity for payments on debt
contracts. By reducing default and credit risk, it helps maintain the market
value of those debt instruments. In the modern financial ecosystem, most of
those debt securities are being traded in a secondary market. The market makers
for these instruments are debt securities dealers that use their balance sheets
to absorb the fluctuations in demand. This exposes the dealers to different
kinds of risks, such as interest rate, exchange rate, and default risks. The
realization of each of these risks could adversely affect the price of the debt
derivatives. Derivatives such as interest rate swaps, foreign exchange swaps,
and credit default swaps are designed to be insurance by transferring the risks
from the holders of those assets to investors who are more equipped to take on
those risks. Derivative dealers enable the transfer of the risk using their balance
sheet by making the market for these derivatives. In the process, both kinds
of securities dealers create market liquidity for the assets they are dealing with.
Elastic legal policy, as a result, could maintain the value of the securities dealers’
positions and reduce the price risk they face by reducing the risk of defaults by
the issuers of those debt securities.
Looking at the legal framework that constructed the financial system
reveals some faults and gaps that need to be filled. The elastic legal policy
tool provides the stability that the 2008 economy desperately needed, fulfilling
one of the Fed’s core missions- financial stability. However, this tool does not
achieve progress solely on its own but in conjunction with the dealer option
tool. During the financial crisis of 2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed,
the connection between the two became more apparent. At the cusp of the
2008 crisis, for instance, the Fed had an opportunity to prevent or at least
lessen the degree of severity of the recession by adjusting some laws. In March
of 2008, Bear Sterns needed a $30 million dowry from the Fed to acquire JP
Morgan. Only six months later, Lehman Brothers faced the same problem. To
their dismay, a private suitor could not be found. After that, the government
had two possible ways to proceed, (1) to bail out the investment bank or (2)
let it fall. Their decision to let the company go bankrupt led to a series of
unfortunate events that unraveled the financial market. If the Fed had a law
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allowing Lehman Brothers to turn to the Fed and be guaranteed assistance such
as the ones provided by the dealer option tool, the 2008 economy could have
had a different story.
5 Hybridity
At first glance, one might consider these two tools separately. After all, elastic
legal policy works in the capital market while the dealer option works in the
money market. However, there is undeniable hybridity among the two tools.
That hybridity stems from the interconnectedness between the capital market
and the money market and their collective effect on the real economy. In the
modern financial market, shadow banking connects these two markets. Shadow
banking is money market funding of capital market lending.7 A fault of the
current unconventional monetary policy tools is that they only focus on one
segment of the market at a time. However, given that many of the mechanisms
of the capital and money market are intertwined, it is important to consider
them at the same time. These two tools fulfill that goal and take into account
the hybridity of the two markets in their construction.
Both tools are legally constructed. Law gives credibility to the financial
markets. It structures them to function efficiently to prevent market failure. The
dealer option tool, for instance, would only be possible through the expansion of
legal policy. The tool utilizes the elasticity of law to extend benefits to nonbank
institutions. Pistor (2013) argues that the function of law in financial markets
is to enforce claims and demand accountability from people and institutions.
The legal backing gives a contract power. These two tools use the power of law
to solve the main issues during the zero lower bound: the lack of liquidity and
lack of stability caused by financial friction. Both tools mitigate these frictions
by reducing default risk and increasing liquidity.
The function of both tools together to address the fire-sale problem in
the repo market, for instance, could reveal how intertwined they are at their
core. At the height of the financial crisis, liquidity was scarce. As a result,
most holders of outstanding repo contracts had difficulty fulfilling their financial
commitments. This led to the extensive sale of securities that were pledged as
collateral in the repo market. These securities were mostly sold at lower than
market prices. This phenomenon later was known as a fire-sale in the repo
market. This creates unfortunate cascading effects. First, the fire-sale could
increase the possibility of default for those issuers whose value of securities is
negatively impacted by this fire-sale. The reduction in the price of securities
will make it more expensive for these issuers to issue new debt securities in the
capital market. Second, since most of the securities lenders in the repo market
7Mehrling, (2012)
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are securities dealers, who are financing their positions in the repo market, they
are the ones that are forced to default in fulfilling their commitments in this
market. The implementation of the dealer option and elastic legal policy tools
could prevent these outcomes. The dealer option could give these securities
dealers access to the Fed’s liquidity facilities. At the same time, the elastic legal
policy could provide the issuers of those securities more leniency in terms of the
time frame and interest payment so that they would not have to default. The
problem of fire-sale would be prevented through a combination of the two tools.
6 Conclusion
The 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis had essential lessons that would shape the
future of central banking. These lessons include the importance of supporting
market-based finance and the interconnectedness of cash flows. In this paper, we
introduce two options that enable the Fed to backstop market-based finance and
relax the terms of debt contracts. Both options would be implemented as a last
resort when all other options have been exhausted. The “dealer option” allows
the Fed to directly provide funding liquidity to the primary providers of market-
liquidity, which are securities dealers. The second tool enables the Fed to make
legal constraints more elastic in order to reduce the risk of default and fire-sales.
In a market-based economy, where the price of collateral depends on market-
liquidity, and the cash-flows are interconnected, the survival of the financial
system depends on well-functioning securities dealers and the ability of the
debtors to make their payments. Typically, the securities dealers create market-
liquidity by financing their securities position in the repo market. Therefore, if
the securities dealers’ access to the funding-liquidity becomes uncertain or very
expensive at times, it might endanger the whole financial system. These two
tools improve financial stability and provide liquidity by expanding credit and
reducing the likelihood of debtors’ defaults in times when liquidity is scarce.
Last but not least, this paper is an introduction to the possibilities
of the utilization of law in finance. It shines a light on the ability of the law
through adjustments to have a similar impact on stimulating the economy as
any other monetary policy tools. Whether in terms of derivatives contracts or
adjusting the legal framework of the Federal Reserve, further research could
unravel a multitude of possibilities. Follow up papers could discuss the specific
legal enhance the involve securities dealers’ and debtors’ new responsibilities
as they start to have access to the Fed’s balance sheet and face more elastic
conditions during the crisis, respectively. These legal requirements can involve
holding excess liquid assets and being supervised by financial regulators.
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